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Abstract : The relationships between inflation and macro-economic instability are discussed 
analytically, using a simple monetary model with rational expectations, with an application to 
the case of Madagascar. The recent macroeconomic history of this country suggests that high 
inflation is correlated with high volatility of the inflation rate and the real effective exchange 
rate. The relevance of this observation is confirmed by an empirical analysis of the 
relationships between inflation, competitiveness and instability in Madagascar. 
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1. Introduction 
 
  The concept of macroeconomic instability is widely used in the policy-oriented 
literature. However, this concept is almost never really defined, and seems to refer in turn to 
high inflation, overvalued currency, unstable real exchange rate, balance of payment deficit, or 
fiscal deficit, etc. Roughly speaking, everything that is going wrong in a country’s 
macroeconomic condition is often called macroeconomic instability. It is then implicitly 
entailed that what a country suffering from these ills ought to do is to implement a 
stabilization policy. Few authors have attempted to define precisely what is macroeconomic 
instability, but it is evident that this notion plays a useful role for indicating a situation of 
economic malaise, where the economy does not seem to have settled in a steady position, and 
where, eventually, something needs to be done for putting it back on track. An exception to 
this rule is provided by Elbadawi and Schmidt-Hebbel (1998), where an indicator of 
macroeconomic instability is produced for a large number of countries, with an interesting 
econometric application, showing how this instability is bad for long-term growth. However, 
this empirical construct does not have the required theoretical underpinnings for clarifying the 
analysis and leading to precise policy conclusions. 
  The present paper aims at providing more precision to this concept, both theoretically, 
using a simple monetary model with rational expectations, and empirically, with an 
application to the semi-open insular economy of Madagascar. The imperfect openness of this 
economy results from the high transport cost implied by insularity, making non tradable goods 
quite important. The theoretical model used is a drastically simplified variant of the model 
presented in Azam (1999.b), which emphasizes the fiscal role of the real exchange rate. The 
latter is crucial in most developing countries, and in Africa in particular, where a large share 
of fiscal revenues are levied on foreign trade, and where the so-called counterpart funds of 
foreign aid provide an important part of government revenues. For example, in Madagascar, 
foreign aid represented 10.2 % of GNP in 1994 (World Bank, 1997), most of it ending up in 
the government budget. Azam (1997 and 1999.a) and Yiheyis (2000) have shown the 
relevance of this fiscal role for the CFA zone countries and for various other African 
countries. The analysis of the rational expectations equilibria of this model brings out the links 
existing between high inflation and the joint volatility of the real exchange rate and the 
inflation rate, and some aspects of the government’s fiscal and exchange rate policies. In line 
with the theory of sunspot equilibria, macroeconomic instability is related to a problem of 
multiple rational expectations equilibria, in application of the Woodford conjecture, which 
Shigoka (1994) and Drugeon and Wignolle (1996) have shown to apply to continuous-time 
models. The inflation rate and the real exchange rates are jointly determined by the 
equilibrium of the model, and the instability of one entails the instability of the other. This 
shows how illusory is the elegant distinction introduced by Corden (1993) between real targets 
and nominal anchor, as the alternative goals of exchange rate policy in developing country. A 
precise analysis is thus provided of how inflation affects some key relative prices, and their 
instability, and thus blurs the messages sent by the markets. The relevance of real exchange 
rate volatility for developing countries has been demonstrated in particular by Caballero and 
Corbo (1989), who show that it affects negatively their export performance. 
  Madagascar provides an interesting ground for applying these ideas, because its recent 
macroeconomic history displays alternating periods of relative stability and instability, against 
a background of poverty and underdevelopment. It is one of the poorest countries in the world, 
with an income per capita of 230 US$ in 1995, although its economic potential has always 
seemed quite promising. There is a relatively educated population, by African standards, with 
a female enrollment rate in secondary education of 14 % in 1993, and the country has a   2 
diversified resource base. However, misguided policies of the past have sent the economy 
astray. In the second half of the seventies, when the government had a clear socialist leaning, 
this country adopted a large public investment program, which eventually pushed the country 
into a crisis. The latter was so deep that shortages of consumer goods occurred in the 
countryside, leading to a fall in agricultural production, and in cash crops more particularly 
(Azam, Berthélemy and Morrisson, 1991). The Malagasy economy has never really recovered 
from this shock, and real GDP per capita has fallen by about 40 % between 1970 and 1994. 
Real GDP would have to grow for 15 years at the sustained rate of 6 % per annum if the 
economy was to recover its 1970 level of real GDP per capita, if population was to carry on 
growing at the current average rate of 2.6 % per annum (IMF, 1995). However, these past 
achievements are a proof of the potentials of this economy, which remain to be mobilized. 
 












This country entered into a wide ranging adjustment program in the mid-eighties, 
including in particular a gradual move to a more market-oriented economy. In particular, the 
rice market was liberalized, with a stabilizing impact on the real price of rice, the main staple 
in this country (Berg, 1989, Azam and Bonjean, 1995). Output responded to the reform by 
some growth, which is represented in figure 1. It shows that the output of paddy increased by 
about 20 % between its low point of 1985 and its peak of 1993. It fell back slightly after that, 
so that it is safe to say that the reforms of the rice market have led to a sustainable increase in 
paddy production about 15 %. 
The reform process has been disturbed by political turmoil, in 1991, leading to a 
change in government, with free elections held in 1993. Reforms have been carried on since, 
and a sweeping reform of the exchange and trade system was implemented in May 1994. 
Despite these deep reforms, the Malagasy economy has resumed its downwards slide in the 
1990s, as can be seen from figure 2, which depicts the fall in real output per capita since 1990. 
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Like most low-income developing countries, Madagascar is subjected to large external 
shocks. Figure 3 shows the terms of trade, in logarithm. On average over this period, their 
value is 4.49. Therefore, this chart shows that the Malagasy terms of trade fluctuated roughly 
within a 30 %-wide band around its mean value. In other words, Malagasy exports lost about 
60 % of their international purchasing power between 1987 and 1991, when the international 
prices of most commodities crashed on the world markets. 
 












   4 
This economy has a very cyclical performance in terms of inflation, with a recurring 
inflation crisis every six or seven years, where the rate of inflation jumps over 20 or 30 % for 
a year or two (IMF, 1996). This occurred in 1974, 1981-83, 1988, and 1994-95. The latter 
inflationary episode saw the inflation rate stay above 45% for about a year. Otherwise, the rate 
of inflation fluctuates around 10%. The inflationary episodes affect the competitiveness of the 
economy, and entail some macro-economic instability, which is described in section 2 below. 
Section 3 looks in more detail at the role of the central bank in the determination of these 
results. Section 4 begins the more analytical part of the paper, and presents the simple 
theoretical model that explains the link between high inflation and macroeconomic instability. 
Section 5 presents some empirical results, showing the determinants of the real effective 
exchange rate and of its volatility, and the determinants of the inflation rate, estimated using 
monthly data. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Inflation and Macro-economic Instability: A Narrative. 
 
  The surges in inflation that have been alluded to above are strongly correlated with 
major changes in the nominal and the real exchange rates. The latter is a key variable in the 
structural adjustment process, as it is the main determinant of competitiveness and current 
account performance. This close relationship between inflation and competitiveness shows 
that the monetary and exchange rate policies have a determinant impact on the performances 
of the real economy in this country. The present section is devoted to the joint analysis of the 
changes in the rate inflation and its relationship with the real effective exchange rate, which is 
a trade-weighted index of the price level of the main trading partners, relative to the domestic 
price level, all expressed in FMG (Malagasy franc) at the ruling exchange rate. This index is 
an imperfect indicator of the theoretical concept of real exchange rate, in that the possible 
over-valuation of the currency of any of the main trading partners of the country would entail 
an under-estimation of the over-valuation of the domestic currency. Nevertheless, this 
indicator is very convenient to use, because it is available at the monthly frequency, and it is 
the favorite indicator of competitiveness used by the IMF. 
  The nominal effective exchange rate series for 1983-97 is represented in figure 4, 
together with the consumer price index series. The exchange rate history of the Malagasy 
franc over these 15 years is that of a continuing depreciation, interrupted by two large step 
devaluations, one in 1987:06, and one in 1994:05, which was in fact the market response to a 
temporary shift to a regime of free floating. The former resulted in a depreciation of the 
nominal effective exchange rate of 48.5%, and the latter of 56.5%. Each of these devaluation 
episodes has been followed by a period of rather high inflation, against a background of low 
inflation, hovering most of the time about 10 % per annum. Several other more moderate step 
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Figure 4: Nominal Effective Exchange Rate  
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This comes out clearly from figure 5, where the rate of change of the CPI over 12 
months is represented, computed as the year-to-year difference in the logarithm of the CPI. It 
shows two high inflation episodes, one from mid-1987 to the end of 1988, and one from early 
1994 to mid-1996. These inflationary episodes were clearly related to the two devaluations. 
Notice, however, that the 1994-96 inflationary episode started about six months before the 
currency attack, while inflation had also started to accelerate before the 1987 devaluation. It is 
not so clear whether the more drawn out inflation episode of 1985, which remained roughly 
about 20% per annum, was the consequence of the 1984:03 devaluation of the FMG, because 
it seems to have occurred with a longer lag than the other two. However, this more lagging 
response might result from the smaller rate of change of the parity, which might have 
dampened the speed of the inflation response.  
  Because of the large inflationary response of the consumer price index to the large step 
devaluation shocks, their degree of effectiveness vanished relatively quickly. This can be seen 
from figure 6, which shows the real effective exchange rate and the rate of change of the 
nominal effective exchange rate. Examination of the former series suggests that it returned to 
its trend value within less than a year after the 1987:06 devaluation, while the impact of the 
1994:05 devaluation lasted about two years, before the real effective exchange rate returned to 
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Figure 6: Real Effective Exchange Rate and  
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  Beside these two devaluation-cum-inflation episodes, figure 6 also shows that the time 
profile of the real effective exchange rate can be described as comprised of two periods.   7 
Before the first massive devaluation, one observes a steady real depreciation of the FMG, 
followed by a period of rough stability of the real effective exchange rate. In particular, 
between 1988 and 1990, the exchange rate was managed, under a system of crawling peg, 
with a view to stabilize the real effective exchange rate. During most of 1993, and the 
beginning of 1994 before the devaluation, the FMG shows a clear tendency to appreciate in 
real terms, which played a part in determining the choice of moving to the float in 1994:05. 
The latter was in fact the government response to a speculative attack. Although figure 6 
clearly shows the occurrence of the massive devaluations, by presenting the month-to-month 
rate of change of the nominal effective exchange rate, it hides the fact that the inflationary 
episodes saw the rate of crawl rise to high levels for relatively long periods. Computed over 
12 months, it rose over 20 % between 1986:08 and 1988:05, then for two months starting in 
1991:10, and then again in a more sustained fashion in 1994:05-1995:09. Notice that the 
increase in the rate of crawl in 1986 predates the currency crisis. 
The paddy market played an active role in the 1994 currency crisis, as it often does in 
many African countries. This is a highly speculative market, as inventories of paddy are the 
main inflation-proof asset held by a large number of people in Madagascar (Azam and 
Bonjean, 1995). The price of paddy has a clear seasonal pattern, with a low point usually in 
May, just before the beginning of the next harvesting season. During the year preceding the 
1994 devaluation, paddy has been the star performing asset in this country : those who bought 
paddy in June 1993 and sold it in March 1994 made a record real return of 49.8 %. This 
suggests that the real price of paddy, deflated by the CPI, should be used by the central bank 
as part of a potential early warning device for speculative attacks against the FMG.  
  By comparing the two preceding charts, one can observe that the time profiles of the 
rate of inflation and the real effective exchange rate have some similarity. This is confirmed 
by analyzing their time-series relationships. First, these two series are borderline integrated of 
order 1 ( ∼ I(1)). This is shown in table 1, which presents the values of the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller unit root test for these two variables, both in level and in first difference.  
 
Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Test 
(5% critical value = - 2.88) 
          :            Level   :   First Difference  : 
 
Inflation  Rate    :  -  2.73   :  -  4.88   : 
Real Effective Exchange Rate (log):  - 2.14    :  - 6.84    : 
 
  Second, these two variables are co-integrated, with a Johansen Likelihood Ratio test of 
18.47, to be compared with the 5% critical value of 15.41. In the co-integrating equation, the 
growth rate of the nominal effective exchange rate, which is close to a dummy variable for the 
two massive devaluations, has been included as an exogenous forcing variable. 
  However, the co-integrating equation only provides some guidance regarding the long-
run relationship between these two variables. It is far from a satisfactory econometric analysis 
of the determinants of the real effective exchange rate. Figure 7 represents the scatter diagram 
of the rate of inflation and the real effective exchange rate, together with the simple regression 
line that can be estimated by OLS between them. The simple regression line only provides a 
very crude description of their long-run joint behavior. It is quite evident that a deeper analysis 
of the relationship between the two series is required, for capturing the shorter-run dynamic 
relationship between them. This is done in section 4 and 5 below, where a more thorough 
analytical and econometric analysis of these two variables is performed.   8 













  In the coming section, we carry on with the narrative, by describing the demand for 
reserves by the central bank, as well as some other variables under its control. 
 
3. Aspects of the Central Bank Portfolio Behavior. 
 
  Inflation and competitiveness, which are jointly determined, as shown by the previous 
section, are affected by the behavior of the central bank.. This section presents some aspects 
of the central bank portfolio behavior, that will be shown below to affect these two variables. 
  Figure 8 represents the (log of) the ratio of reserves to domestic credit. This is a good 
indicator of the stance of the central bank policy towards foreign exchange. One can see three 
contrasted periods. Until the beginning of 1989, the amount of reserves held by the central 
bank is clearly rising, relative to domestic credit. Standard macro-economic theory suggests 
that this can be interpreted as a policy aiming at preventing any real appreciation of the 
exchange rate. In fact, as seen from figure 6, this period was mostly characterized by a 
continuing depreciation, except at the end of 1987, when some temporary real appreciation 
occurred, as inflation started to respond to the first massive devaluation. In other words, this 
period is one of fairly aggressive monetary policy in favor of external competitiveness, which 
achieved a sustained and substantial depreciation of the real effective exchange rate. However, 
it ended up in the strongly inflationary episode that was described above, after the massive 
devaluation of 1987.  
Then starts a period of declining reserves, relative to domestic credit, which does not 
entail any real appreciation of the FMG until, say, 1993. On the contrary, one observes a slight 
real depreciation, during a period marked by a remarkable stability of the real effective 
exchange rate, partly due to the crawling peg policy, and of the inflation rate. Then starts a 
period of real appreciation, in 1993 and 1994, which ends up in the speculative attack   9 
described in the previous section, inducing the government to adopt a regime of free floating 
in May 1994.  
 















However, after about a year of floating, reserves start piling up again, showing that the 
central bank adopted an active foreign exchange market policy, accumulating reserves. This 
was probably aimed at preventing the real exchange rate from appreciating again, relative to 
some implicit target. It can be seen at figures 4 and 6 that both the nominal effective exchange 
rate and the real effective exchange rate had a slight tendency to depreciate during this period. 
This policy was adopted after the episode of sharp real appreciation that marks the end of the 
post-float inflationary episode, as can be seen in figures 5 and 6. However, the determination 
of the exchange rate remained market-based, without administrative fixing. 
  The other crucial element of the central bank portfolio behavior is its credit to the 
treasury. This is the channel by which the government extracts some seignorage from the 
private sector, via the inflation tax. This is often regarded as the main cause of inflation in 
developing countries. 
  Figure 9 shows the real value of the stock of credit to the treasury. Four different 
phases can be distinguished. Before the 1987 devaluation, this stock is high and steady, and 
this is probably the root of the problem that led to this devaluation. Then, the government 
pursues a drastic policy of reducing its indebtedness to the central bank, which lasts until the 
political turmoil of 1991. The new government abandons this austerity policy, and the stock of 
real credit to the government starts rising at a brisk pace. This leads to the switch to the 
floating exchange rate regime that was adopted in 1994, after the real appreciation period and 
the speculative attack described above. On the face of it, then, these two speculative attacks 
bear some resemblance to the theoretical framework introduced by Krugman (1979), where 
the accumulation of central bank credit to the treasury leads eventually to the currency attack 
(see as well Dornbusch, 1987). Then, the government starts reducing its indebtedness towards 
the central bank again, in real terms. This means that the surge in inflation that followed the 
1994 devaluation played probably a part in reducing the real value of the central bank credit to 
the government. The accumulation of reserves seen above played also a part in bringing about 
this result.   10 
  The econometric analyses that follow show that this portfolio behavior of the central 
bank had a significant impact on inflation and the real effective exchange rate. This underlines 
the intimate links that exist between the real and the monetary sides of the economy. This 
suggests that monetary policy, and more generally the portfolio behavior of the central bank, 
should be regarded as an integral part of the government’s policy towards the real economy, 
and in particular of the structural adjustment program, and, more generally, of the 
development strategy of the country.  
 

















  To sum up, the foregoing brief quantitative analysis of the macroeconomic history of 
Madagascar can be described by the following stylized facts. We observe two periods of 
macroeconomic instability, before 1989, and between 1994 and mid-1996, and a period of 
relative stability in the interim period, in 1989-93. The two instability spells are characterized 
by high and volatile inflation, together with an unstable real effective exchange rate. The level 
of reserves, relative to domestic credit, is low and rising, as if the government was trying to 
prevent the currency from appreciating in real terms, relative to some implicit target, while the 
terms of trade are relatively high. In both cases, the stock of central bank credit to the 
government is high, in real terms, and a currency attack takes place in the course of each 
period of instability, in May 1987 and May 1994, resulting in a massive nominal depreciation 
of about 50 %. During the interim stability episode, the rate of inflation is low and stable, the 
real effective exchange rate has a regular time profile without major swings, while the terms 
of trade are low, the reserves are declining, as is the stock of central bank credit to the 
government. 
  The following two sections provide the simple theoretical framework that helps 
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4 : A Simple Model of Inflation and Macroeconomic Instability 
 
 Denote  M the quantity of money and p the price level. Real money balances are then 
defined as m = M/p. Let e be the exchange rate. For the sake of simplicity, units are selected 
such that the international price of tradable goods in terms of foreign currency is equal to 1, so 
that their nominal price in domestic currency is e. Then, the price level is an increasing (and 
linearly homogenous) function of e and of the price of non-tradable goods, which is kept 
implicit in what follows. Define q = e/p as the real exchange rate. This is in fact an increasing 
function of the real exchange rate as defined usually as the ratio of the price of tradable goods 
to the price of non tradable goods. There is a one-to-one correspondence between these two 
definitions.  
In order to model the fiscal role of the real exchange rate, we split government 
expenditures and revenues into two different budgets, depending on whether they are directly 
affected by the exchange rate or not. Assume that the government has, on the one hand, more 
expenditures than revenues that are indexed on the price level p, and, on the other hand, more 
revenues (foreign aid included) than expenditures indexed on the exchange rate. Let D and F 
be the excess of expenditures over revenues indexed on p and the excess of revenues over 
expenditures indexed on e, respectively. Regarding D and F as constant is a simple way of 
capturing the idea that the government is assumed not to subordinate its budgetary policy to 
the goal of monetary stability. Hence, the monetary financing of the overall deficit implies: 
 
  d M/d t = p D - e F.          ( 1 )  
 
 Denote  π  = d log p/d t the rate of inflation and δ  = d log e/d t the rate of crawl of the 
national currency chosen by the government. As seen in the previous section, the exchange 
rate regime in Madagascar can be described as a managed float, or a crawling peg, during 
most of the period under study, as testified by the behavior of the reserves. This is captured 
simply here by assuming that the government controls δ. Moreover, this rate of crawl is 
assumed to be credible and known to the private agents. Then, the real depreciation of the 
domestic currency is governed by the following differential equation : 
 
  d q/d t = (δ - π) q.          ( 2 )  
 
  Using the notation m for real money balances presented earlier, (1) may be rewritten 
as: 
 
  d m/d t = D - q F - π  m.         ( 3 )  
 
  Assume that the demand for real money balances is determined à la Cagan (1956) as a  
function of the expected rate of inflation  π e  by the following function: 
 
  m = λ (π e),  λ ' < 0 .          ( 4 )  
 
  The analysis is restricted to the case of rational expectations equilibria, where (4) holds 
with  π e =π  and | π e|  << ∞ , ∀ t > 0, where 0 is the present date. 
  Then, using (3) and (4), yields: 
 
  d π /d t = (1/λ ' ) d m/d t = (1/λ ' ) (D - q F - π λ (π )).    (5)   12 
 
  Therefore, inflation is stabilized (d π /d t =  0) for all pairs { q , π } such that: 
 
  D - q F = π λ (π ) .          ( 6 )  
 
  Real seignorage, represented by the left-hand side of equation (6), is a linear 
decreasing function of q. Notice that this negative slope would be reinforced if we assumed D 
and F to be functions of q, as the natural assumptions to make would be D’ < 0 and F’ > 0, as 
a real depreciation would increase the real value of foreign trade, on which a lot of taxes are 
based, thus increasing F, while it would reduce the real value of public expenditures on non 
traded goods, which can be safely assumed to be dominant in D. May be also, a real 
appreciation (a fall in q) would trigger some increases in wages and salaries, as the cost of 
living would go up, entailing an increase in the real value of D. Hence, our simplifying 
assumption (D’ = F’ = 0) does not entail any loss of generality. The proceeds of the inflation 
tax, represented by the right-hand side of this equation, form a non monotonic concave 
function of π , according to the inflation-tax Laffer-curve mechanism (Bruno and Fischer, 
1990, Dornbusch et Fischer, 1993). Define the inflation-tax maximizing rate of inflation as : 
 
  π
max = argmax  π  λ( π   ) .         ( 7 )  
 
Therefore, (6) can be represented as a non monotonic convex curve, labeled mm in 
figures 10.a and 10.b. This implies that any level of the real exchange rate that is consistent 
with the existence of a stationary equilibrium, i.e. located on mm, could correspond equally to 
a low or a high rate of inflation, depending on the side of the curve on which the equilibrium 
is located. Hence, knowledge of the equilibrium real exchange rate provides very little 
information on the macroeconomic situation. Off the mm locus, the inflation rate increases 
over time for the { q , π } pairs located above it, according to (5), and it decreases over time 
below this locus. This captures the fact that, if the real exchange rate q depreciates, the fiscal 
deficit decreases, as the real value of aid and trade-related taxes increases. Then, private 
agents must be reducing their real money balances. This is only consistent with the rational 
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Combined with the real exchange rate dynamics embodied in (2), the dynamics of this 
system can be analyzed with the help of the phase diagrams 10.a and 10.b. The locus of points 
such that d q/d t = 0 is denoted qq . Case 10.a, where the chosen rate of crawl lies below the 
inflation-tax maximizing inflation rate, represents a saddle point with a zero-dimensional 
convergent sub-space. Then, as there is no pre-determined variable in the system, the economy 
jumps instantly at point E, and stays there as long as the chosen rate of crawl δL is credible. 
Hence, the choice of the rate of crawl determines uniquely the real exchange rate and the 
inflation rate in this case. In case 10.b, we have a different outcome, as the chosen rate of 
crawl δH is larger than π
max. Now, the steady-state point S is stable, with a two-dimensional 
convergent sub-space. Moreover, a close examination of the phase diagram shows that the 
stationary point can only be reached from either the north-east, or the south-west, i.e. along a 
trajectory with a positive slope in this space. 
  We can confirm analytically the diagnosis derived above from the phase diagrams as 
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.    (8) 
  The determinant of the Jacobian matrix in (8) is always positive, while its trace has the 
same sign as λ+πλ’, which in turn is the same as the sign of π
max- δ, because of the assumed 
inflation-tax Laffer curve. Therefore, the eigenvalues of this matrix are both positive, if the 
chosen rate of crawl is smaller than the inflation-tax maximizing rate of inflation, or they are 
both negative in the opposite case. This confirms the results derived above from the phase 
diagrams. 
  The economic predictions derived from this model are entirely different in these two 
cases. When the chosen rate of crawl is below the inflation-tax maximizing rate of inflation, 
we have a unique rational expectations equilibrium, which determines simultaneously the rate 
of inflation and the real exchange rate. Any point other than the stationary point E would 
belong to an explosive trajectory, and would thus violate the convergence condition for a 
rational expectations equilibrium. Thus, in this case, the government controls the inflation rate 
and the real exchange rate through the rate of crawl, for given values of the parameters of the 
system. In the opposite case, where the stationary point S is stable, any point inside the phase 
space belongs to a trajectory that converges eventually to S, and thus qualifies as a rational 
expectations equilibrium. Therefore, we have now a continuum of rational expectations 
equilibria.  
The economic intuition behind this result is as follows : in both cases, whether the rate 
of crawl is chosen high or low, the agents know rationally that any deviation of the rate of 
inflation above the rate of crawl, for example, would entail gradually a real appreciation of the 
currency, and an increase in the rate of money creation entailed by the resulting increase in the 
fiscal deficit, unless the rise in the inflation tax compensates it. Sooner or later, the former 
effect will come to dominate the latter, because of the concavity of the inflation-tax Laffer 
curve. Then, real cash balances will start to grow, as the real deficit widens, and this can only 
happen if agents are prepared to absorb higher real money balances, i.e. if they expect the rate 
of inflation to come down. Under rational expectations, this means that the actual rate of 
inflation will respond to a deviation above the rate of crawl by going down, after a while, as 
the real exchange rate appreciates. Hence, some oscillations in the rate of inflation and in the 
real exchange rate would follow from this mechanism.  
The difference between the two cases comes from the elasticity of the demand for 
money with respect to the expected rate of inflation. If the economy is on the increasing side   14 
of the inflation-tax Laffer curve, then the gradual fall in inflation will entail a destabilizing fall 
in the inflation tax, resulting in a further fall in expected inflation leading the agents to absorb 
a further increase in the fiscal deficit. This deviation-amplifying force works as a disciplining 
device, as agents are not prepared to embark on such an explosive path, by the convergent 
expectations assumption. On the contrary, when the economy is on the other side of the 
inflation-tax Laffer curve, the gradual fall in expected inflation increases the proceeds of the 
inflation tax, thus providing a stabilizing influence. Then there is no threat of embarking on an 
explosive trajectory, and agents will rationally predict convergence to a finite equilibrium, 
whatever the initial deviation of expected inflation from the rate of crawl. Hence, expected 
deviations will be self-fulfilling in this case. 
  The real-world translation of a continuum of rational expectations equilibria is the 
prediction of a high volatility of the variables involved. The system has no anchor, so that the 
variables can jump from one trajectory to the other, as a response to any information whose 
only relevance is to affect the agents’ expectations. In the theoretical literature, models of 
sunspot equilibria have been devised to capture this idea (see Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, for 
an introduction). There is no point in going into the mathematical developments of this theory 
here, as the main component of these equilibria is a continuum of rational expectations 
equilibria, like the one that has been shown to exist in the neighborhood of point S above. 
Then, Shigoka (1994) and Drugeon and Wignolle (1996) have shown that Woodford’s 
conjecture applies even in continuous-time models. This conjecture states that there exist 
stationary sunspot equilibria in the neighborhood of any stationary point of a deterministic 
model where there exists a continuum of perfect foresight equilibria converging to this   
stationary point. In this case, any information that affects the agents’ expectations will be self-
fulfilling, even if it has no other intrinsic relevance for the economy than that of affecting 
expectations. As the economy is not anchored to a unique equilibrium trajectory by the 
fundamentals, it can be buffeted away by any random shocks affecting the agents’ 
expectations. Consequently, this model leads to the prediction that the volatility of the 
inflation rate and of the real exchange rate will be higher when the chosen rate of crawl is 
above some inflation threshold than when it is below it. Conversely, it suggests that an 
excessive volatility of the rate of inflation and of the real exchange rate could be corrected by 
lowering sufficiently the rate of crawl. 
  This threshold is determined by the parameters of the demand for money function, 
which determine the inflation-tax maximizing rate of inflation. Adam, Ndulu and Sowa 
(1996) have offered a set of estimates for Kenya, Ghana, and Tanzania  that suggests that this 
rate is much lower in Africa than in other parts of the world. Their estimates suggest that the 
typical inflation-tax maximizing inflation rate for African economies, as judged from the three 
case studies presented, would be about 15 or 20 %. This is very low by European standards. 
More recent work on the Tanzanian economy by Randa (1999) yields a figure about 44 %. No 
estimate of this kind is available for Madagascar, but it seems safe to conjecture that the 
corresponding figure would be of the same order of magnitude as the estimates in Adam, 
Ndulu and Sowa (1996). As we have seen above, the rate of crawl rose above 20 % for several 
months during the episodes of macroeconomic instability in this country. 
 
5 : Empirical Analysis of the Real Effective Exchange Rate, the 
Inflation Rate, and their Volatility. 
 
  The simplified model analyzed above is certainly too simple and too abstract for being 
applied directly to the complexities of the real world. However, it yields a basic insight that is   15 
probably worth investigating further, as it is reminiscent of some themes that have been 
present in the macroeconomic literature for a long time. It predicts (1) that inflation and the 
real exchange rate are jointly determined, and (2) that their joint volatility increases when the 
rate of crawl, and hence the underlying trend rate of inflation, rises above some threshold 
level. This is reminiscent of Friedman’s classic idea that when inflation is high, it is also 
highly variable. In this section, we test a simplified version of these predictions, looking at the 
stochastic processes generating  the inflation rate and the real exchange rate, as measured by 
the real effective exchange rate, as well as their volatility, testing in particular the hypothesis 
that the inflation rate is a significant determinant of the latter. We have already seen in section 
2 that the two variables under study are integrated of order 1 (see table 1), and are co-
integrated. We go now deeper into the dynamic analysis of these series. 
After an intensive search procedure, going from the general to the simple, à la Hendry, 
the following equation has been selected for the real effective exchange rate: 
 
  ∆log(REER) = - 0.219 + 0.827 ∆log(NEER)   + 0.011 log(RATIO)   (9) 
         (3.49)   (12.38)          (2.57) 
- 0.034 log(REER(-1))  - 0.214 ∆INFL 
        (3.24)           (2.14) 
                [0.32]
N 
  N = 160, R
2 = 0.80, F = 158.91, D.W. = 2.09, LM(2)-F = 0.22,  
White-F = 2.00, ARCH(1) = 22,55. 
 
In equation (1) REER and NEER are the real effective exchange rate and the nominal 
effective exchange rate, respectively. Notice that the former, lagged once, has a significant 
negative impact on its own growth rate, suggesting that this variable is stationary after all, 
once all the other effects are taken into account. This is an example of conditional stationarity. 
The ratio of reserves of the central bank to domestic credit is noted RATIO, and is meant to 
capture the stance of the exchange rate policy pursued by the government. As seen in section 
3, an increase in reserves indicates the willingness of the government to depreciate the 
domestic currency faster, ceteris paribus, in real terms. Lastly, INFL is the rate of inflation, 
computed over 12 months, so that no seasonality effect is expected. The number of lags is 
noted (-1), and ∆ is the first difference operator. The sample used covers 1984 :02-1997 :05, 
and  N is the number of observations. The numbers in parentheses below the estimated 
coefficients are White’s Heteroscedasticity-Consistent t ratios, because of the 
heteroscedasticty problem detected by the relevant tests. There are two serial correlation tests, 
the DW, which is biased here because of the inclusion of the lagged endogenous variable, and 
the  LM test, which tests serial correlation up to the second order. They signal no 
autocorrelation problem. Then come two heteroscedasticity tests, White’s F test detects some 
slight heteroscedasticity, while the ARCH test spots some massive auto-regressive conditional 
heteroscedasticy. These two problems do not create biases for the estimation of the 
coefficients of the equation, but raise problems for the usual t ratios. This explains why the 
heteroscedasticity-consistent ones have been used instead.  
The number in the square brackets with a superscript N is the Nakamura and 
Nakamura (1981) exogeneity test. It aims at testing whether the estimate of the coefficient of 
∆INFL, which is theoretically endogenous, would have been different, had two-stage least 
squares been used instead of OLS. It is done by estimating an auxiliary equation including the 
residuals of equation (11) below, which explains ∆INFL, as an additional variable beside the 
latter in equation (9). The t ratio corresponding to this variable in this auxiliary equation, and 
reported here, tests precisely whether the difference between the estimates obtained under the   16 
two estimation method is significant. The low number found here shows that using TSLS 
instead of OLS would have made no significant difference. 
However, it would be disappointing just to be content with correcting the tests for the 
heteroscedasticity and ARCH problems detected above. It is in fact worthwhile to investigate 
the process generating this changing residuals variance, in relation to the theoretical model 
described above. We are thus interested in analyzing whether the rate of inflation is a forcing 
variable that affects the stochastic process generating the volatility of the two series of 
interest. Using the GARCH  framework (see e.g. Enders, 1995), we can estimate the residuals-
variance-generating process in the following way : 
 
RES
2 = 0.003 INFL + 0.338 RES
2(-1).      (10) 
 (2.54)   (1.61) 
  N = 159, R
2 = 0.14, F = 24.40, LM-F= 4.34, White-F = 1.38. 
 
  In this equation RES
2 is the square of the residuals from equation (9). Although it 
suffers from a little residuals serial correlation, this equation shows that inflation is the main 
driving force behind the changing variability of the real effective exchange rate, which raises 
the problem described above. The higher is the inflation rate, the more volatile is the real 
exchange rate. Caballero and Corbo (1989) have shown empirically that the variability of the 
real exchange rate is negatively related to export performance in LDCs. Then our result 
creates a link between inflation and export performance. 
  Therefore, the two econometric exercises performed above show a crucial link 
between real and monetary factors in the Malagasy economy : the rate of inflation affects both 
the rate of real depreciation, and its volatility. Notice that in equation (9), an increase in the 
rate of inflation entails a negative effect on the real exchange rate, i.e. an appreciation. This is 
the short run effect, to be distinguished from the positive long-run effect found in the co-
integration equation and in figure 7. The latter suggests that a lot of the observations might be 
located on some trajectories heading to the ‘wrong side’ of the mm curve. The other 
interesting point worth mentioning about this equation is that an increase in the ratio of 
reserves to domestic credit has an impact going in the direction of a real depreciation, as 
expected from standard macro-economic theory.  
  Using a similar approach, we have estimated an equation for explaining the rate of 
inflation. This is the equation yielding the residuals used at equation (9) for performing the 
Nakamura and Nakamura (1981) exogeneity test. After an intensive search à la Hendry, the 
following specification has been selected. 
 
  ∆INFL = 0.219 - 0.079 INFL(-1) + 0.081 ∆log(NEER(-5))       (11) 
       (2.66)  (2.45)           (2.38) 
+ 0.038 log(REER(-1)) + 0.027 log(REAV(-1)) 
        (2.48)           (2.14) 
  N = 160, R
2 = 0.12, F = 5.18, D.W. = 1.97, LM(2)-F = 0.41,  
White-F = 1.25, ARCH(1) = 2.35. 
 
  This equation relates the change in the rate of inflation to its lagged value, with a 
negative sign, suggesting also that inflation might be stationary after all, once the impacts of 
all the exogenous variables have been taken into account. The impact of the devaluations is 
significant, with a 5-months lag. This confirms the visual impression gathered from 
examining figures 5 and 6. The impact of the REER lagged once is significantly positive, 
confirming the effect found in the long-run (co-integrating) equation. This may be interpreted   17 
as a feed back effect from the real economy, and in particular from its external 
competitiveness, on the monetary side. Lastly, REAV is the real value of the central bank 
credit to the treasury. Its positive impact shows the standard inflationary impact of 
government budget deficits, when they are financed through the « printing press ». As it is 
lagged once, it should not raise any problem of strict exogeneity. This equation is affected by 
no heteroscedasticity, probably because of the de-seasonalization implied by the use of the 
inflation rate computed over 12 months. However, the following exercise recovers the 
expected effect of inflation on volatility. 
In order to test for the impact of the rate of inflation on its own volatility, we now 
compute the rate of change of the consumer price index on a month-to-month basis 
∆log(CPI). This is a stationary variable, with an augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics equal to   - 
5.24, to be compared with a critical value at the 5 % threshold equal to - 2,87. The preferred 
equation reads : 
 
  ∆log(CPI) = 0.356 + 0.060 log(REER(-1)) + 0.038 ∆log(NEER(-5)) (12) 
           (4.40)   (4.27)           (2.45) 
- 0.014 log(RATIO(-1)) - 0.072 log(CPI(-1)) + 0.079 log(CPI(-12))  
        (2.96)            (2.05)       (2.00) 
+ 0.031 log(REAV(-1)) 
  (3.59) 
 
  N = 161, R
2 = 0.18, F = 5.80, D.W. = 1.94, LM(2)-F = 0.65,  
White-F = 3.01, ARCH(1) = 2.79. 
 
  All the tests used here have been explained before. Only White’s heteroscedasticity 
test signals a problem. The t ratios used here for testing the significance of the individual 
coefficients are again the heteroscedasticity consistent ones. As done above, the 
heteroscedasticity problem is not just corrected, but it is analyzed instead, with a view to 
understand its cause. Using again the GARCH framework applied at equation (11), the 




2 = 0.003 +0.018 ∆log(CPI(-1)) + 0.178 RES
2(-1).    (13) 
  (1.80)   (3.90)         (2.33) 
  N = 160, R
2 = 0,11, F = 9,12,  LM(2)-F = 2,35. 
 
Here again, the positive effect of inflation on the variability of the residuals can be 
observed. The quality of the fit is not good, but the F statistics confirms the significance of 
this regression at the conventional level.    
  Hence, we have observed not only some long-run (co-integration) and shorter-run 
relationships between inflation and the real effective exchange rate, but also a positive 
relationship between inflation and the volatility of the former two variables. These results 
provide some support for the basic insight derived from the analysis of the theoretical model 
of the previous section. 
  Given the insights provided by the theoretical and empirical analyses performed in the 
last two sections, we can now return to the issues raised by the currency crises that occurred 
during the two phases of macroeconomic instability that we have identified. When discussing 
figure 9 above, the remark was made that the behavior of the reserves-to-domestic credit ratio, 
compared with the time profile of the real and nominal exchange rates, seemed to square   18 
relatively well with the predictions resulting from a model of a currency crisis à la Krugman 
(1979). However, the analysis performed in this section and the preceding one are pointing in 
the opposite direction, suggesting that a self-fulfilling element should be at work in this case. 
We know in particular from Obstfeld (e.g. Obstfeld, 1996) that self-fulfilling speculative 
attacks are closely related to the problem of multiple rational expectations equilibria, and 
recent empirical results (Berg and Pattillo, 1999) lean in this direction, by suggesting that their 
predictability is very limited. Hence, this type of currency crises can be expected to be an 
ever-present possibility when the rate of crawl moves above the inflation-tax maximizing rate 




  This paper has argued, both theoretically and empirically, that the rate of inflation is 
the crucial (proximate) determinant of macroeconomic instability in Madagascar. After 
presenting a statistical description of the recent macroeconomic history of this country, 
bringing out the relationships between the rate of inflation and the real exchange rate, in 
section 2, this paper has offered a description of the central bank’s behavior with respect to 
foreign exchange reserves and credit to the government. Then, a simple monetary model with 
rational expectations has been used to explain the simultaneous determination of the rate of 
inflation, the real exchange rate, and their joint volatility. It suggests that the level of the 
inflation rate is the fundamental component of macroeconomic instability  : when it rises 
above some threshold, the rational expectations equilibrium is not locally unique, and the 
model predicts that a strong volatility of the two endogenous variables sets in.  
  Although the empirical analysis presented next did not test precisely the theoretical 
model presented, which is probably too simple and too abstract for that, it has tested the main 
insight that derives from its analysis. Paying special attention to the heteroscedasticity 
problems arising from the equations estimated using Malagasy monthly data on inflation, the 
real effective exchange rate, and the policy tools used by the central bank, the econometric 
analysis presented has confirmed that the rate of inflation has a significant positive impact on 
its own volatility, and on the real exchange rate and its volatility.  
  These results have clear implications for the conduct of macroeconomic policy in this 
country. The central bank plays a crucial role in affecting both the rate of inflation and the real 
effective exchange rate in Madagascar, as well as their volatility. Its policy should thus be 
geared on a monetary target, like the trend rate of inflation, and real targets like the degree of 
competitiveness of the economy would be automatically taken care of by the same token, 
given the other determinants of the fiscal deficit. The central bank of Madagascar has several 
tools in its tool kit that have significant impact on the behavior of this variable. First, the level 
of the nominal effective exchange rate has been shown to affect both the rate of inflation, 
which responds with a short lag to any change in the former, and the real effective exchange 
rate, on which it has a temporary impact. Second, the portfolio behavior of the central bank 
also affects these two variables, with the ratio of foreign exchange reserves affecting 
significantly the real effective exchange rate, while the real value of the stock of credit to the 
treasury seems to affect predominantly the rate of inflation. Hence, the central bank is 
equipped to be a major actor in the structural adjustment program of the Malagasy economy, 
and in its longer-run strategy. In particular, the exchange rate turns out to be the main 
instrument to be used for maintaining macroeconomic stability. Keeping the rate of crawl low 
enough is the main proximate objective to be pursued in this policy framework. 
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